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Abstract 
 
      This study investigates the relationships among industry specialist auditors, 
outside directors, and financial analysts.  Specifically, we examine the effect of analyst 
coverage on the association between auditor industry specialization and outside 
directorship.  We find that outside directors are less likely to hire industry specialist 
auditors for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage.  
Our findings suggest that analyst coverage moderates outside directors’ demand for 
industry specialist auditors, that is, financial analysts may compete with industry 
specialist auditors to some extent in monitoring financial reporting process.   
 Jerry Sun and Guoping Liu. 2011. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 30(4), 
367-382. Post-print 
 
 
 
1 
 
1.    Introduction 
      Industry specialist auditors provide expertise services to their clients because they 
have great industry-specific knowledge (Solomon, Shields, and Whittington, 1999; 
Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang, 2003).  As a result, outside directors are inclined to hire 
industry specialist auditors, who can effectively monitor financial reporting process, in 
order to reduce the likelihood of their reputational/litigation losses.  Abbott and Parker 
(2000) and Beasley and Petroni (2001) document that the proportion of outside directors 
on the audit committee or the board is positively associated with auditor industry 
specialization, suggesting that outside directors are more willing to hire industry 
specialist auditors than inside directors.   
      Like industry specialist auditors, financial analysts are industry experts and 
possess industry-specific knowledge as they track firms to make earnings forecasts and 
stock recommendations.  Recently, Yu (2008) and Knyazeva (2007) find that high 
analyst coverage is associated with less earnings management, suggesting that analysts 
play an important monitoring role in financial reporting process.  Moreover, Dyck, 
Morse, and Zingales (2008) indicate that analysts may be more likely to detect 
accounting fraud than external auditors.  Thus, as an external corporate governance 
mechanism, analysts are competitive with external auditors.  If high analyst coverage 
can improve financial reporting quality to some extent, firms will have to rely less 
heavily on auditor industry specialization in detecting accounting misstatement or fraud.  
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Thus, outside directors may have less pressure to hire specialist auditors if their firms are 
covered by more analysts.  In other words, high analyst coverage may reduce outside 
directors’ demand for industry specialist auditors.  Furthermore, the possible audit fee 
premium charged by auditor specialists may also reduce the willingness of hiring 
specialist auditors if firms are covered by more analysts and have high financial reporting 
quality.  
      This study investigates the relationships among industry specialist auditors, 
outside directors, and financial analysts based on a sample of 11,748 firm-year 
observations over the period 1996 to 2006.  Specifically, we examine whether analyst 
coverage affects the relationship between auditor industry specialization and outside 
directorship.  We find that auditor industry specialization is less positively associated 
with board independence for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low 
analyst coverage, suggesting that analyst coverage moderates the effect of board 
independence on auditor industry specialization.  This also suggests that outside 
directors are more likely to hire industry specialist auditors especially when another 
external corporate governance mechanism, i.e., analyst coverage, is weak.        
      This study contributes to the literature in the following ways.  First, we extend 
the limited research on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the demand for 
industry specialist auditors.  Prior research (Abbott and Parker, 2000; Beasley and 
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Petroni, 2001) examines the relationship between auditor industry specialization and 
outside directorship.  Unlike those studies, our study focuses on the moderating effect of 
analyst coverage on the relationship between auditor industry specialization and outside 
directorship.  Our findings suggest that corporate governance mechanisms interactively 
affect clients’ demand for industry specialist auditors.  Nevertheless, we recognize that 
our results are suggestive rather than conclusive because of the potential endogeneity 
problem that outside directors may be attracted to well managed firms with superior 
financial reporting practices as they require less monitoring effort and entail lower 
reputational / litigation risk.  Second, this study sheds more light on the monitoring role 
of analysts in financial reporting process.  Prior research on this topic (e.g., Yu, 2008; 
Knyazeva, 2007) is limited to examining the effect of analyst coverage on earnings 
quality.  Our study considers the effect of analyst coverage on the demand for auditor 
industry specialization.  We provide further evidence that analysts play an important 
monitoring role in financial reporting process.   
      The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We introduce the 
background in Section 2, develop the hypothesis in Section 3, discuss the research design 
in Section 4, present the empirical results in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.  
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2.    Background 
2.1.   Auditor industry specialization 
Industry specialist auditors are auditors who have gained great training and 
experience concentrated in a specific industry.  Solomon et al. (1999) find that industry 
specialist auditors have more accurate non-error frequency knowledge than non-industry 
specialists.  Owhoso, Messier, and Lynch (2002) suggest that industry specialists can 
more effectively detect seeded errors in staff work papers during the audit review process.  
Low (2004) finds that auditors’ industry specialization improves their audit risk 
assessments.  Hammersley (2006) finds that matched specialists (i.e., specialists 
working in their industry) develop more complete problem representations about the 
seeded misstatement when they receive partial- or full-cue patterns than when they 
receive no-cue patterns, whereas mismatched specialists are not able to develop more 
complete problem representations even when they receive full-cue patterns.  These 
behavioral auditing studies suggest that auditor industry specialization can enhance the 
effectiveness of auditors’ work as a result of their greater industry-specific knowledge.   
      There is also a stream of archival auditing research that examines the effect of 
auditor industry specialization on financial reporting quality.  Balsam, Krishnan, and 
Yang (2003) investigate the association between earnings quality and auditor industry 
specialization.  Using the absolute value of discretionary accruals and earnings response 
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coefficients as measures of earnings quality, they find that clients of industry specialist 
auditors have higher earnings quality than clients of non-specialists.  Dunn and Mayhew 
(2004) examine the effect of auditor industry specialization on clients’ disclosure strategy.  
They find that analysts’ rating of disclosure quality is higher for clients of industry 
specialist auditors than for clients of non-specialists in unregulated industries where 
enhanced disclosures add more value than in regulated industries.  Stanley and DeZoort 
(2007) and Romanus, Maher, and Fleming (2008) find that firms audited by industry 
specialists are less likely to have accounting restatement than firms audited by 
non-specialists.  Lim and Tan (2008) find that both earnings response coefficients and 
increased propensity to miss analysts’ forecasts are more positively associated with 
non-audit services acquired from industry specialist auditors than from non-specialist 
auditors.  These archival auditing studies indicate that auditor industry specialization 
can increase clients’ financial reporting quality. 
 
2.2.   Outside directors and industry specialist auditors  
      Outside directors can more effectively monitor managers in financial reporting 
process than inside directors as outside directorship is presumably independent of the 
management and is less likely to become an instrument of the management.  There is 
empirical evidence that outside directorship itself can enhance financial reporting quality. 
Klein (2002) finds that the proportion of outside directors on the board or the audit 
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committee, i.e., board or audit committee independence, is negatively associated with the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, suggesting that outside directors are effective in 
constraining earnings management.  Jaggi, Leung, and Gul (2009) also show that board 
independence can reduce earnings management.   Beasley (1996) finds that the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud is lower for firms with high board independence 
than for firms with low board independence.   Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) suggest 
that firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose information when they are more 
effectively monitored by the board or the audit committee.  Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and 
Whalen (2007) document that firms with higher board independence have lower 
information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements.  
      Outside directors may have a high demand for auditor industry specialization 
because these directors may be more concerned with monetary or reputational losses that 
result from lawsuits or SEC sanction.  Abbott and Parker (2000) investigate the 
relationship between auditor industry specialization and outside directorship of audit 
committee members.  Using a sample of 500 U.S. listed companies, they find that firms 
with audit committees that do not include employees are more likely to hire industry 
specialist auditors.  Beasley and Petroni (2001) examine the effect of outside 
directorship of board members on the choice of external auditors for a sample of 681 U.S. 
insurance companies.  They document that insurers with high proportion of outside 
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directors on the board are more likely to choose a specialist auditor than insurers with 
low proportion of outside directors on the board.  In summary, prior research provides 
empirical evidence on the positive association between outside directorship and auditor 
industry specialization, suggesting that outside directors hire industry specialist auditors 
to increase financial reporting quality.  
 
2.3.   Governance role of analysts 
      Dyck et al. (2008) report that analysts can detect 16.9% of the total corporate 
fraud cases revealed by external governance mechanisms, which is higher than the 
percentage of the cases brought to light by auditors (11.3%), suggesting that analysts may 
be as competitive as auditors in terms of overseeing managers.  Analysts’ remuneration 
and career prospects are affected by their reputation, which is established over time with 
job performance.  To make accurate forecasts and valuable recommendations, analysts 
are motivated to track corporate information, acquire industry-specific knowledge, and 
perform insightful analysis.  Thus, analysts have advantage to monitor managers.   
      Recently, Yu (2008) examines whether analyst coverage plays a governance role 
in terms of constraining earnings management.  He documents a negative association 
between analyst coverage and the level of discretionary accruals.  He also finds that 
firms with high analyst coverage are less likely to just beat or meet earnings benchmarks 
than firms with low analyst coverage.  His findings suggest that firms followed by more 
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analysts engage in less earning management than firms followed by fewer analysts.  
Similarly, Knyazeva (2007) finds that analyst coverage is negatively associated with 
earnings management.  Overall, these studies suggest that analysts can effectively 
oversee financial reporting process while the research on the governance role of analysts 
is still limited.   
 
3.    Hypothesis  
      Prior research (e.g., Balsam et al., 2003; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004; Romanus et al., 
2008) finds that auditor industry specialization can enhance financial reporting quality. 
Outside directors have an incentive to ensure high financial reporting quality because 
accounting fraud or low financial reporting quality impairs their reputation and increases 
the risk of lawsuits (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, and Riley, 2002).  Abbott and Parker 
(2000) and Beasley and Petroni (2001) document a positive relationship between auditor 
industry specialization and outside directorship.  These findings suggest that outside 
directors may not be able to effectively monitor financial reporting process without hiring 
industry specialist auditors.  Although outside directors (especially those sitting on the 
audit committee) play a monitoring role in financial reporting process, they do not audit 
the financial statements themselves.  Some outside directors may not have accounting 
expertise and experience.  External auditors can aid outside directors in the oversight of 
financial reporting process by auditing the client’s financial statements and interacting 
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with outside directors to resolve the client’s accounting issues (Klein, 2002).  Hence, 
outside directors would be more willing to hire industry specialist auditors so that they 
can effectively monitor financial reporting process to protect their reputational capital and 
reduce their litigation risks exposure.  
      Even though outside directors have requisite accounting and financial expertise, 
they may find it suboptimal to oversee financial reporting process as a specialist auditor 
would because outside directors usually sit on several companies’ boards and thus are 
busy.  On the one hand, since outside directors’ busyness can weaken their monitoring 
effectiveness (Fich and Shivdasini, 2006), they may demand specialist auditors to offset 
or mitigate the negative effect of their busyness.  On the other hand, however, busy 
outside directors may be less involved in or may hardly monitor the process of hiring 
external auditors, resulting in a lower level of auditor industry specialization in their 
companies.   
     Analysts can play a governance role in financial reporting process because their 
routine work facilitates the whistle blowing of accounting misstatement or fraud.  Yu 
(2008) and Knyazeva (2007) find that analyst coverage can effectively constrain earnings 
management.  Dyck et al. (2008) indicate that analysts are more likely to reveal 
corporate fraud than external auditors.  Thus, existing literature suggests that firms 
followed by more analysts will have higher quality financial reporting than firms with 
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lower analyst coverage.  Firms have a certain demand for external corporate governance, 
and analysts and auditors are two important components of the external mechanism.  
While outside directors cannot hire analysts, they can hire external auditors based on the 
level of analyst coverage.  If high analyst coverage can reduce accounting misstatement 
or fraud to a certain extent, outside directors would have less pressure to hire industry 
specialist auditors since their firms do not need to rely heavily on auditor specialization in 
overseeing financial reporting quality.  Thus, firms with high analyst coverage may have 
a lower demand for auditor specialization than firms with low analyst coverage.  
     Moreover, firms with high analyst coverage and thus low financial reporting fraud 
risks may be less willing to hire industry specialist auditors if specialist auditors charge 
audit fee premium.  Craswell, Francis, and Taylor (1995) find that industry specialist 
auditors earn more premium than non-specialists in Australia.  Casterella, Francis, 
Lewis, and Walker (2004) find that small size clients pay fee premium to U.S. specialist 
auditors.  Francis, Reichelt, and Wang (2005) document that audit fee premium is paid 
to city-level industry specialist auditors in U.S.  Overall, these studies suggest that 
auditing costs are probably higher when industry specialists are hired.  Firms with low 
analyst coverage and thus low accounting information quality need to pay premium to 
specialist auditors in order to obtain higher quality audit.  Firms followed by more 
analysts, however, may have less accounting misstatement or fraud, and thus outside 
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directors would have less pressure to rely on auditor specialization and pay premium to 
specialist auditors.  Even if specialist auditors do not charge premium, as shown in some 
existing studies, firms that do not need to rely heavily on specialist auditors may have 
more choices in selecting their auditors, and thus may be less likely to hire a specialist 
auditor.   
      Based on the above discussion, we conjecture that outside directors of firms with 
high analyst coverage may demand lower auditor industry specialization than outside 
directors of firms with low analyst coverage, which means that the relationship between 
auditor industry specialization and board independence may be moderated by analyst 
coverage.  Thus, we develop the hypothesis as follows:  
H1:  Auditor industry specialization is less positively associated with board 
independence for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst 
coverage.  
 
4.    Research design 
4.1.   Data collection 
      We first collect the data on the board of directors from the RiskMetrics Directors 
database over the period 1996 to 2006.1 Using these data, we compute board 
independence, board size, and directors’ meeting attendance.  Second, we collect the 
                                                        
1
      1996 to 2006 is the whole data period of RiskMetrics Directors database when we initiated data 
collection.      
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data on individual analysts’ earnings forecasts from the I/B/E/S detail file database.  
Following Yu (2008), analyst coverage is measured using individual analysts’ forecasting 
activities for each firm.  Third, we collect the data on CEO characteristics such as CEO 
ownership, CEO tenure, and CEO compensation from the Execucomp database.  Fourth, 
we collect the data on financial statements and auditors from the Compustat database to 
compute auditor industry specialization and several control variables.  Finally, we 
collect the data from the CRSP database to compute bid-ask spread and firm age.  The 
above data sets are merged to yield a sample of 11,748 firm-year observations over the 
period 1996 to 2006.  Table 1, Panel A presents the sample breakdown by year.  Table 
1, Panel B shows the most representative industries of the sample firms.2 
Insert Table 1 
 
4.2.   Model  
      We test our hypothesis by estimating the following regression model: 
 AISPE = β0 + β1 BDIND + β2 ANCOV + β3 BDIND*ANCOV + β4 SIZE + β5 DEBT    
       + β6 ROA + β7 FINAC + β8 SPREAD + β9 AGE + β10 BDSIZE + β11 BMATN  
       + β12 CEOOWN + β13 CEOTEN + β14 CEOCOM + Year dummies  
       + Industry dummies + ε                                    (1) 
where  
                                                        
2
      We find similar results when we exclude financial and utilities firms from our sample.  
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    AISPE = auditor industry specialization, measured as the ratio of the sum of the  
            square root of the total assets of the clients of an auditor in a two-digit SIC  
            industry to the total sum of the square root of the total assets of all clients  
            of the auditor (Behn, Choi, and Kang, 2008),  
   BDIND = board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors  
           on the board,  
  ANCOV = analyst coverage, measured as the total number of analysts who issued  
           forecasts of year t+1’s earnings per share for a firm during year t (Yu,   
2008),3 
    SIZE = size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, 
   DEBT = debt ratio, measured as long-term debt divided by total assets, 
ROA = return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by  
      total assets, 
  FINAC = financing, measured as the annual increase in long-term debt and common  
          share capital divided by total assets, 
SPREAD = bid-ask spread, measured as the yearly median of daily spread, i.e., the  
         difference between ask and bid price divided by the mid-point, 
   AGE = firm age, measured as the number of years for which a firm has been included  
                                                        
3
      The results are not substantially changed when using the natural logarithm of analyst coverage in 
the regression. 
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         in the CRSP database,  
BDSIZE = board size, measured as the number of directors on the board, 
BMATN = board meeting attendance, measured as the proportion of directors on the  
         board who attended less than 75% of board meetings, 
CEOOWN = CEO ownership, measured as the percentage of common shares owned by a  
          CEO, 
CEOTEN = CEO tenure, measured as the number of years for which an employee has 
          been the company’s CEO, 
CEOCOM = CEO compensation, measured as the natural logarithm of a CEO’s total  
           compensation. 
      In equation (1), the coefficient on BDIND*ANCOV (i.e., β3) is expected to be 
negative if H1 is supported.  We include SIZE and DEBT in the model because Francis, 
Maydew, and Sparks (1999) suggest that large firms and firms with low debt ratio may be 
more likely to hire high quality auditors.  Johnson and Lys (1990) and Abbott and Parker 
(2000) indicate that return on assets may be positively associated with the engagement of 
high quality auditors because a more profitable client is more likely to pay the fee 
premium to such auditors.  Thus, we add ROA in the model.  FINAC is included in the 
model as DeFond (1992) and Johnson and Lys (1990) suggest that a firm’s acquisition of 
new funds may be positively related to the use of a specialist auditor as the specialist can 
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provide high quality services which enhance the credibility of the firm’s financial 
reporting at the time of debt or equity issuance.  Titman and Trueman (1986) indicate 
that high risk firms are less likely to choose high quality auditors.  Thus, we include 
SPREAD and AGE to capture firm-specific risk.  BDSIZE and BMATN are included in 
the model because Beasley and Petroni (2001) suggest that high quality boards are more 
likely to hire specialist auditors.  CEO characteristics such as CEO ownership, CEO 
tenure, and CEO compensation reflect CEO entrenchment and agency problems of a firm 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Fahlenbrach, 2003).  On the one 
hand, high CEO entrenchment may reduce the effectiveness of outside directorship on the 
board.  On the other hand, outside directors may be more willing to hire specialist 
auditors when the firm has more agency problems.  Since these CEO characteristics may 
affect firms’ auditor choice, we include CEOOWN, CEOTEN, and CEOCOM in the 
model.  In addition, we include year dummies and industry dummies in the model to 
control for fixed year effect and fixed industry effect.  Based on the above discussions, 
we expect that the coefficients on SIZE, ROA, FINAC, AGE, and BDSIZE are positive, 
and that the coefficients on DEBT, SPREAD, and BMATN are negative.  We do not 
expect the sign of the coefficients on CEOOWN, CEOTEN, and CEOCOM because these 
CEO characteristics may either positively or negatively affect the demand for industry 
specialist auditors.4   
                                                        
4
     All continuous variables in equations (1) are winsorized at the level of 1% and 99%.  We find 
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5.    Empirical results  
      We report descriptive statistics in Table 2.  We find that the mean of auditor 
industry specialization is 0.041, which is close to 0.042 reported in Behn et al. (2008).  
The median of auditor industry specialization is 0.031, which is close to 0.037 reported in 
Behn et al. (2008).  The mean and median percentages of independent directors on the 
board are 65.8% and 66.7%, respectively.  The mean and median of analyst coverage are 
11.00 and 13.41, suggesting that on average, our sample firms are followed by 
approximate 11 to 13 analysts.   
Insert Table 2 
      Table 3 provides the Pearson correlations among variables.  The highest 
correlation coefficient is 0.59 for firm size and CEO compensation, subsequently 
followed by the correlation coefficient for firm size and board size (r = 0.57) and the 
correlation coefficient for firm size and analyst coverage (r = 0.55).5  Thus, large firms 
have higher CEO compensation and larger boards of directors, and are followed by more 
analysts.  We find that large firms and firms with high board independence are more 
likely to hire industry specialist auditors.  The results on correlation coefficients also 
indicate that firms with high CEO compensation may be followed by more analysts, 
while firms with low stock liquidity may be followed by fewer analysts.  Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
similar results on testing the hypothesis when these variables are not winsorized.  
5
     Since the highest correlation coefficient is significantly lower than 0.80, multicollinearity is less 
likely to be a substantive issue.   
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results suggest that board independence may be higher for older firms, but lower for 
firms with high CEO tenure.6   
Insert Table 3 
      As a comparison with prior studies (e.g., Abbott and Parker, 2000; Beasley and 
Petroni, 2001), we present the main effect of board independence on auditor industry 
specialization in columns 3 and 4 in Table 4.  Similar to prior studies, we find that board 
independence is positively associated with auditor industry specialization (t-statistic = 
1.50, p-value < 0.10), suggesting that outside directors may have a demand for auditor 
industry specialization.  Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4 show the main results on testing the 
hypothesis.  We find that the coefficient on the interaction of board independence and 
analyst coverage is negative and significant (t-statistic = -2.59, p-value < 0.01), consistent 
with H1.  Thus, auditor industry specialization is less positively associated with board 
independence for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst 
coverage.  The results suggest that analyst coverage may moderate outside directors’ 
willingness or desire to hire industry specialist auditors.  In addition, we find that the 
coefficients on SIZE, BDSIZE, and CEOTEN are significantly positive, suggesting that 
large firms, firms with large boards, and firms with long CEO tenure may have a higher 
demand for auditor industry specialization.  We also find a negative and significant 
                                                        
6
    The results based on the correlation analysis should be cautiously interpreted because the 
confounding effect of other factors is not controlled for.  
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coefficient on DEBT, ROA, SPREAD, AGE, and CEOCOM, which indicates that firms 
with high debt ratio, more profitable firms, firms with high stock liquidity, older firms, 
and firms with high CEO compensation may have a lower demand for auditor industry 
specialization.     
Insert Table 4 
      In equation (1), β1 captures the effect of board independence on auditor industry 
specialization when firms are not followed by any analysts.  (β1 + β3 *ANCOV) captures 
the effect of board independence on auditor industry specialization for a given value of 
ANCOV.  Thus, - β3 *ANCOV/β1 reflects the extent to which the effect of board 
independence on auditor industry specialization is moderated by analyst coverage.  If 
ANCOV takes the value of 13.41 (i.e., the mean of analyst coverage), then - β3 
*ANCOV/β1 is 74% (i.e., - (-0.042*13.41)/0.763), which means that on average, analyst 
coverage reduces 74% of the effect of board independence on auditor industry 
specialization.  Therefore, the moderating effect of analyst coverage on outside 
directors’ demand for industry specialist auditors is also economically significant.  
      To test the robustness of our results, we conduct additional analyses as follows.   
First, we test the hypothesis by dividing the full sample into two subsamples: (1) high 
analyst coverage subsample, which consists of firm-year observations whose analyst 
coverage is greater than the median of analyst coverage for a given year, and (2) low 
19 
 
analyst coverage subsample, which consists of firm-year observations whose analyst 
coverage is not greater than the median of analyst coverage for a given year.  We 
estimate the following regression for the high analyst coverage subsample and the low 
analyst coverage subsample separately: 
AISPE = β0 + β1 BDIND + β2 SIZE + β3 DEBT + β4 ROA + β5 FINAC + β6 SPREAD  
      + β7 AGE + β8 BDSIZE + β9 BMATN + β10 CEOOWN + β11 CEOTEN  
      + β12 CEOCOM + Year dummies + Industry dummies + ε          (2) 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 report the results of the high analyst coverage subsample.  
The coefficient on board independence is positive but not significant.  The results of the 
low analyst coverage subsample are reported in columns 5 and 6 in Table 5.  We find 
that the coefficient on board independence is positive and significant (t-statistic = 1.93, 
p-value < 0.05).  Combined together, the results suggest that outside directors from 
firms with low analyst coverage have higher demand for auditor industry specialization, 
consistent with H1.     
Insert Table 5 
      Second, we run two-stage regressions to control for the possible endogenous 
relationships among three governance mechanisms including auditor industry 
specialization, board independence, and analyst coverage.  Since auditor industry 
specialization affects financial reporting quality, which may influence board composition 
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and analyst following, board independence and analyst coverage are likely to be 
endogenous variables in equation (1).  To address this concern, we estimate the 
first-stage models as follows: 
ANCOV = α0 + α1 EXPANCOV+ α2 SIZE+ α3 DEBT+ α4 ROA+ α5 FINAC + α6 SPREAD   
    + α7 AGE+ α8 BDSIZE+ α9 BDATN+ α10 CEOOWN+ α11 CEOTEN 
    + α12 CEOCOM + Year dummies + Industry dummies + ε            (3)                                     
 BDIND = α0 + α1 LAGBDIND + α2 SIZE+ α3 DEBT+ α4 ROA+ α5 FINAC  
     + α6 SPREAD + α7 AGE+ α8 BDSIZE+ α9 BDATN+ α10 CEOOWN+ α11 CEOTEN           
     + α12 CEOCOM + Year dummies + Industry dummies + ε               (4)     
In equations (3) and (4), EXPANCOV and LAGBDIND are instrumental variables.  
Following Yu (2008), EXPANCOV is expected analyst coverage, computed as follows: 
     ∑
=
=
n
j
jEXPANCOVEXPANCOV
1
                                   (5) 
where EXPANCOVj is measured as the number of analysts who followed the company 
from broker j in year 1995 multiplied by the ratio of the size of broker j in year t to the 
size of broker j in year 1995.  We use the lagged value of board independence (i.e., 
LAGBDIND) as an instrumental variable of board independence (Fisher, 1965).  We also 
include control variables in equations (3) and (4) as those firm characteristics may affect 
the demand for governance mechanisms including analyst coverage and board 
independence.  The Hausman’s specification test indicates that the instrumental 
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variables are appropriate.  After estimating equations (3) and (4), we estimate equation 
(1) by replacing ANCOV and BDIND with the fitted values of these variables from 
equations (3) and (4).  Table 6, Panel A reports the results of the first-stage regressions.  
Table 6, Panel B presents the results of the second-stage regression.  Similarly, we find 
that auditor industry specialization is less positively related to board independence for 
firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage (t-statistic = 
-3.14, p-value < 0.01).  Thus, the results after allowing for endogeneity still support our 
hypothesis.  However, we note that there is a high autocorrelation in board 
independence (r = 0.85), which indicates that lagged board independence may not be a 
good instrument.  We recognize that these results are suggestive rather than conclusive.       
Insert Table 6 
      Third, we examine whether our results are sensitive to using audit committee 
independence instead of board independence.7  Table 7 presents the results when 
equation (1) is estimated using audit committee independence, i.e., ACIND.8  We also 
document a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term of ACIND and 
ANCOV (t-statistic = -3.39, p-value < 0.01), consistent with the notion that outside 
                                                        
7
      This study focuses on board independence rather than audit committee independence (the 
proportion of independent directors on audit committees) because all U.S. listed firms should have fully 
independent audit committees after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Therefore, audit committee 
independence has less variation compared to board independence.  
8
      The number of observations is reduced to 10,116 because the RiskMetrics Directors database does 
not provide the data of audit committees for years 1996 and 1997.   
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directors are more willing to hire industry specialist auditors when firms are followed by 
fewer analysts.  Thus, our results are robust to using audit committee independence as a 
measure of outside directorship.       
Insert Table 7 
      Fourth, we examine whether the results still hold if we use the market share 
measure of auditor industry specialization.  The continuous market share measure is 
computed as the ratio of the sum of the sales of the clients of an auditor in a two-digit 
SIC industry to the total sum of the sales of all companies in that industry (Dunn and 
Mayhew, 2004).  Like Abbott and Parker (2000), we also use the categorical variable to 
measure auditor industry specialization.  Neal and Riley (2004) suggest that the market 
share cut-off for specialization should be 1.20 divided by the number of big accounting 
firms.  As the number of big auditors changed over our sample period 1996 to 2006 (i.e., 
Big 6 auditors (1996-1997), Big 5 auditors (1998-2001), and Big 4 auditors (2002-2006)), 
the cut-off is 20% for years 1996 to 1997, 24% for years 1998 to 2001, and 30% for years 
2002 to 2006.  The categorical market share measure is coded “1” if the continuous 
market share measure is greater than the cut-off and “0” otherwise.  
      Columns 3 and 4 in Table 8 provide the results of estimating equation (1) using 
the continuous market share measure.  Likewise, we document a negative and 
significant coefficient for the interaction of board independence and analyst coverage 
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(t-statistic = -1.97, p-value < 0.05).  Columns 5 and 6 in Table 8 report the results of 
running the logistic regression by replacing the continuous measure with the categorical 
measure in equation (1).  We find that the coefficient on BDIND*ANCOV is negative 
and significant (Wald χ2 =2.31, p-value < 0.10).  Therefore, the results based on the 
continuous and the categorical market share measures of auditor industry specialization 
are all consistent with the hypothesis.   
Insert Table 8 
      Fifth, we include inside blockholding and institutional shareholding in equation 
(1).  We collect inside blockholding from the Blockholders database which provides the 
data for years 1996 to 2001.  We also collect institutional shareholding from the 
RiskMetrics Directors database which provides the data on institutional shareholding for 
years 1999 to 2001.  After these two data sets are merged with the original data sets, the 
sample is reduced to 1,841 observations for years 1999 to 2001.  Using the reduced 
sample, we estimate equation (1) after controlling for inside blockholding and 
institutional shareholding.  We still find a negative and significant coefficient for 
BDIND*ANCOV (non-tabulated t-statistic = -2.51, p-value < 0.01). 
      Sixth, we estimate equation (1) using standard errors clustered by both firm and 
year to control for the correlations across firms and years.  The results show that auditor 
industry specialization is less positively associated with board independence when firms 
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have high analyst coverage (non-tabulated t-statistic = -1.77, p-value < 0.05). 
   Seventh, we examine whether the results are driven by the size effect since analyst 
coverage is highly correlated with firm size (r = 0.55).  We split the full sample into two 
subsamples based on median size.  We find a negative and significant coefficient on 
BDIND*ANCOV for both the small size and the large size subsamples (non-tabulated 
t-statistic = -1.74, p-value < 0.05; t-statistic = -3.25, p-value < 0.01, respectively).  
Alternatively, we estimate equation (1) by removing ANCOV and BDIND*ANCOV but 
adding BDIND*SIZE.  We find that the coefficient on BDIND*SIZE is significantly 
positive (non-tabulated t-statistic = 1.88, p-value < 0.05).  Thus, although analyst 
coverage is highly correlated with firm size, the two variables affect outside directors’ 
demand for specialist auditors in different directions.  In other words, it is unlikely that 
our results are driven by the size effect. 
   Eighth, we test the hypothesis by developing an alternative proxy for analyst 
coverage.  We employ the ratio of the number of firms in an industry followed by an 
analyst in a year to the total number of firms followed by that analyst in the same year to 
measure the analyst’s industry expertise.  Analyst coverage is computed as the sum of 
the ratio of all analysts who follow a firm.  This measure incorporates analysts’ 
variations in industry expertise.  We still find that the coefficient on the interaction of 
board independence and analyst coverage is negative and significant (non-tabulated 
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t-statistic = -1.42, p-value < 0.10).     
   Finally, we examine whether the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the 
Regulation Fair Disclosure affects the moderating effect of analyst coverage on the 
relationship between auditor industry specialization and board independence.  The 
dummy variable for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is coded “1” in years 1996 to 2001 and “0” 
otherwise, while the dummy variable for the Regulation Fair Disclosure is coded “1” in 
years1996 to 1999 and “0” otherwise.  We estimate equation (1) by including the two 
dummy variables and their interactions with BDIND, ANCOV, and BDIND*ANCOV.  
We find that no coefficients on these interactions are significant.  Thus, the introduction 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the Regulation Fair Disclosure has no impact on the 
relationships among board independence, analyst coverage, and auditor industry 
specialization. 
       
6.    Conclusion 
      This study investigates the relationships among three corporate governance 
mechanisms: industry specialist auditors, outside directors, and financial analysts.  
Specifically, we examine whether the relationship between auditor industry specialization 
and board independence is moderated by analyst coverage.  We find that outside 
directors of firms with high analyst coverage are less willing to hire industry specialist 
auditors than outside directors of firms with low analyst coverage.  Our findings suggest 
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that analysts may somewhat compete with specialist auditors in monitoring financial 
reporting process.   
      This study also has limitations as follows.  First, our results are limited to large 
firms because companies covered by the RiskMetrics Directors database are primarily 
drawn from S&P 500 and other large corporations.  Since large companies are more 
salient in the capital market and are followed by more analysts than small companies, 
analysts may play a more important monitoring role for large firms than for small firms.  
Thus, it is unclear whether the moderating effect of analyst coverage can be generalized 
to small firms.  Future research may use a sample of small firms to test our hypothesis.  
Second, it is still unclear which way is the best to deal with the endogeneity issue, 
especially for board governance.  Like other corporate governance studies, this study 
faces the difficulty of choosing instruments.  Future research may expend more effort on 
identifying the most appropriate instruments of endogenous governance mechanisms.          
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Appendix  
Variable definition  
 
Variables                               Definition                                     
 
   AISPE = auditor industry specialization, measured as the ratio of the sum of the square root of the total  
           assets of the clients of an auditor in a specific industry to the total sum of the square root of  
           the total assets of all clients of the auditor (Behn et al., 2008),  
  BDIND = board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors on the board,  
 ANCOV = analyst coverage, measured as the total number of analysts who issued forecasts of year  
          t+1’s earnings per share for a firm during year t (Yu, 2008), 
    SIZE = size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, 
   DEBT = debt ratio, measured as long-term debt divided by total assets, 
    ROA = return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets, 
  FINAC = financing, measured as the annual increase in long-term debt and common share capital  
          divided by total assets, 
 SPREAD = bid-ask spread, measured as the yearly median of daily spread, i.e., the difference between  
          ask and bid price divided by the mid-point, 
AGE = firm age, measured as the number of years for which a firm has been included in the  
      CRSP database,  
  BDSIZE = board size, measured as the number of directors on the board, 
  BMATN = board meeting attendance, measured as the proportion of directors on the board who attended  
          less than 75% of board meetings, 
CEOOWN = CEO ownership, measured as the percentage of common shares owned by a CEO, 
CEOTEN = CEO tenure, measured as the number of years for which an employee has been the company’s  
          CEO, 
CEOCOM = CEO compensation, measured as the natural logarithm of a CEO’s total compensation. 
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Table 1 
Sample breakdown  
 
Panel A. By year 
      
Year  Frequency  Percent (%) 
1996 698 5.94 
1997 924 7.87 
1998 1,001 8.52 
1999 1,028 8.75 
2000 1,092 9.3 
2001 1,131 9.63 
2002 1,118 9.52 
2003 1,156 9.84 
2004 1,185 10.09 
2005 1,242 10.57 
2006 1,173 9.98 
Total 11,748 100.00 
   
Panel B. By industry 
       
Two-digit SIC code Industry description Frequency Percent (%) 
13 Oil and gas extraction 361 3.07 
20 Food products 349 2.97 
27 Printing, publishing, and allied products 246 2.09 
28 Chemicals and allied products 901 7.67 
33 Primary metal industries 261 2.22 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 762 6.49 
36 Electrical and electronic equipment 995 8.47 
37 Transportation equipment 403 3.43 
38 Instruments and related products 624 5.31 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 791 6.73 
50 Wholesale trade – durable goods  240 2.04 
63 Insurance carriers 480 4.09 
73 Business services 1,008 8.58 
Others   4,327 36.81 
Total  11,748 100.00 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
       
Variable N Mean Median Std Q1  Q3 
AISPE 11,748 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05 
BDIND 11,748 0.66 0.67 0.17 0.56 0.80 
ANCOV 11,748 13.41 11.00 9.14 6.00 19.00 
SIZE 11,748 7.60 7.42 1.58 6.45 8.58 
DEBT 11,748 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.05 0.30 
ROA 11,748 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.08 
FINAC 11,748 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 
SPREAD 11,748 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
AGE 11,748 25.45 20.00 19.40 11.00 34.00 
BDSIZE 11,748 9.36 9.00 2.62 7.00 11.00 
BMATN 11,748 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
CEOOWN 11,748 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
CEOTEN 11,748 7.95 6.00 7.16 3.00 11.00 
CEOCOM 11,748 7.94 7.91 1.07 7.19 8.65 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 
Pearson correlations 
                            
Variable BDIND ANCOV SIZE DEBT ROA FINAC SPREAD AGE BDSIZE BMATN CEOOWN CEOTEN CEOCOM 
AISPE 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.27***  0.03*** -0.10*** -0.02** -0.08***  0.12***  0.14*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.06*** 0.04*** 
BDIND  0.07*** 0.17***  0.03*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.16***  0.25***  0.07*** -0.06***  0.02* -0.17*** 0.17*** 
ANCOV   0.55*** -0.09***  0.09*** -0.01 -0.23***  0.09***  0.14*** -0.00 -0.04*** -0.01 0.49*** 
SIZE     0.17***  0.05***  0.01 -0.23***  0.40***  0.57***  0.00 -0.03*** -0.09*** 0.59*** 
DEBT     -0.20***  0.39***  0.17***  0.11***  0.15***  0.02*** -0.01 -0.07*** 0.00 
ROA      -0.06*** -0.16***  0.08***  0.05*** -0.02**  0.03***  0.06*** 0.12*** 
FINAC        0.04*** -0.05*** -0.00  0.02**  0.01 -0.01  0.00 
SPREAD        -0.04*** -0.01  0.08*** -0.09*** -0.02* -0.27*** 
AGE          0.39*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.10***  0.20*** 
BDSIZE           0.08*** -0.05*** -0.09***  0.29*** 
BMATN           -0.02**  0.01 -0.01 
CEOOWN             0.10*** -0.02** 
CEOTEN                         -0.07*** 
              
***, **, and * denote a significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests).   
  
 
  
Table 4 
The effect of analyst coverage on the association between auditor industry specialization and 
board independence  
                
Variable Predicted sign   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ?  -0.636 -2.47***  -0.996 -3.40*** 
BDIND +  0.229 1.50*  0.763 2.97*** 
ANCOV ?  -0.024 -6.64***  0.003 0.28 
BDIND*ANCOV -     -0.042 -2.59*** 
SIZE +  0.617 22.18***  0.622 22.30*** 
DEBT -  -1.209 -6.41***  -1.234 -6.54*** 
ROA +  -2.301 -8.21***  -2.299 -8.20*** 
FINAC +  0.256 0.61  0.262 0.63 
SPREAD -  -12.833 -3.72***  -12.127 -3.50*** 
AGE +  -0.013 -8.92***  -0.013 -8.83*** 
BDSIZE +  0.047 3.94***  0.046 3.87*** 
BMATN -  0.056 0.11  0.057 0.12 
CEOOWN ?  9.578 2.27**  9.587 2.27** 
CEOTEN ?  0.004 1.26  0.005 1.36* 
CEOCOM ?  -0.208 -6.85***  -0.211 -6.94*** 
        
Year dummies    Yes   Yes 
Industry dummies    Yes   Yes 
        
N    11,748   11,748 
F-statistic    484.60***   471.91*** 
Adj. R2       59.71%     59.73% 
        
The dependent variable is AISPE rescaled by 100 to simplify the display.   
***, **, and * denote a significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (one-tailed tests).   
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Table 5 
Results on split subsamples  
                
   High analyst coverage  Low analyst coverage 
Variable Predicted sign   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ?  -1.757 -4.56***  0.805 2.16** 
BDIND +  0.033 0.15  0.394 1.93** 
SIZE +  0.565 15.79***  0.574 14.15*** 
DEBT -  -0.797 -2.68***  -1.038 -4.25*** 
ROA +  -2.843 -6.47***  -1.720 -4.71*** 
FINAC +  0.528 0.82  -0.247 -0.45 
SPREAD -  -24.937 -3.58***  -9.089 -2.21** 
AGE +  -0.013 -6.39***  -0.011 -5.21*** 
BDSIZE +  0.073 4.37***  0.010 0.57 
BMATN -  -0.308 -0.42  0.365 0.56 
CEOOWN ?  13.495 1.88**  7.558   1.45* 
CEOTEN ?  0.010 1.88**  -0.001 -0.23 
CEOCOM ?  -0.096 -2.34***  -0.365 -8.08*** 
        
Year dummies    Yes   Yes 
Industry dummies    Yes   Yes 
        
N    5,649   6,099 
F-statistic    223.19***   277.48*** 
Adj. R2       57.93%     61.34% 
        
The dependent variable is AISPE rescaled by 100 to simplify the display.   
***, **, and * denote a significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (one-tailed tests).   
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 Table 6 
Two-stage regression  
 
Panel A. First-stage regression   
                
   Analyst coverage  Board independence 
Variable Predicted sign   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ?  -9.310 -19.51***  0.127 13.97*** 
EXPANCOV +  0.676 95.58***    
LAGBDIND +     0.787 139.26*** 
SIZE +  1.345 24.50***  0.000 0.19 
DEBT -  -4.465 -11.85***  0.011   1.54* 
ROA +  2.358 4.15***  0.002 0.21 
FINAC +  4.088 4.79***  -0.021  -1.32* 
SPREAD -  -65.122 -9.22***  0.006 0.04 
AGE +  -0.037 -12.69***  0.000 4.58*** 
BDSIZE +  -0.038 -1.56*  -0.001 -2.27** 
BMATN -  -2.162 -2.18**  -0.026 -1.39* 
CEOOWN ?  -14.481 -1.72**  0.094 0.60 
CEOTEN ?  0.046 6.70***  -0.001 -6.55*** 
CEOCOM ?  0.789 12.98***  0.004 3.60*** 
        
Year dummies    Yes   Yes 
Industry dummies    Yes   Yes 
        
N    9,680   9,680 
F-statistic    838.43***   758.65*** 
Adj. R2       74.63%     72.69% 
        
36 
 
Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B. Second-stage regression 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? -1.737 -5.06*** 
BDIND_F + 1.078      3.05*** 
ANCOV_F ? 0.024    1.50* 
BDIND_F*ANCOV_F - -0.070                -3.14*** 
SIZE + 0.513                16.35*** 
DEBT - -0.799     -4.11*** 
ROA + -1.781 -6.22*** 
FINAC + 0.267 0.62 
SPREAD - -10.446 -2.89*** 
AGE + -0.009 -5.64*** 
BDSIZE + 0.017 1.41* 
BMATN - 0.296 0.59 
CEOOWN ? 8.916 2.11** 
CEOTEN ? 0.007 2.03** 
CEOCOM ? -0.074 -2.35*** 
    
Year dummies   Yes 
Industry dummies   Yes 
    
N   9,680 
F-statistic   510.68*** 
Adj. R2    65.47% 
 
The dependent variables in the first-stage regression are ANCOV and BDIND.  The dependent variable in 
the second-stage regression is AISPE rescaled by 100 to simplify the display.  EXPANCOV is expected 
analyst coverage, computed as follows: 
     ∑
=
=
n
j
jEXPANCOVEXPANCOV
1
                                    
where EXPANCOVj is measured as the number of analysts who followed the company from broker j in year 
1995 multiplied by the ratio of the size of broker j in year t to the size of broker j in year 1995. 
LAGBDIND is the lagged value of BDIND. BDIND_F and ANCOV_F are the fitted value of BDIND and 
ANCOV from the first stage regression, respectively.   
***, **, and * denote a significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (one-tailed tests).   
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Table 7 
Results on audit committee independence 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? -1.196 -3.36*** 
ACIND + 0.686      2.65*** 
ANCOV ? 0.022 1.44* 
ACIND*ANCOV - -0.055                 -3.39*** 
SIZE + 0.641                21.01*** 
DEBT - -1.414     -6.83*** 
ROA ? -2.493 -8.16*** 
FINAC + 0.316 0.68 
SPREAD - -14.597 -3.73*** 
AGE + -0.013 -8.05*** 
BDSIZE + 0.059 4.36*** 
BMATN - 0.350 0.63 
CEOOWN ? 10.945       2.43*** 
CEOTEN ? 0.003 0.83 
CEOCOM ? -0.219 -6.56*** 
    
Year dummies   Yes 
Industry dummies   Yes 
    
N   10,116 
F-statistic   410.71*** 
Adj. R2    58.64% 
 
The dependent variable is AISPE rescaled by 100 to simplify the display.  ACIND is audit committee 
independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors on audit committees.   
*** and * denote a significance at the level of 1% and 10%, respectively (one-tailed tests).   
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Table 8 
Results on market share measure of auditor industry specialization  
                
   Continuous measure  Categorical measure 
Variable Predicted sign   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient Wald χ2 
Intercept ?  12.889 8.84***  -2.242 83.82*** 
BDIND +  3.320 2.60***  0.517 5.69*** 
ANCOV ?  0.145 2.59***  0.020 4.68** 
BDIND*ANCOV -  -0.158 -1.97**  -0.020 2.31* 
SIZE +  0.894 6.43***  0.063 7.53*** 
DEBT -  -0.552 -0.59  0.013 0.01 
ROA ?  -0.726 -0.52  -0.010 0.00 
FINAC +  -1.624 -0.78  -0.418 1.44 
SPREAD -  -17.615 -1.02  -6.603 5.11** 
AGE +  0.012 1.58*  0.001 0.79 
BDSIZE +  0.217 3.68***  0.024 6.09*** 
BMATN -  -1.538 -0.63  -0.009 0.00 
CEOOWN ?  -2.743 -0.13  5.320 2.32* 
CEOTEN ?  -0.022 -1.30*  -0.009 10.15*** 
CEOCOM ?  0.408 2.69***  0.074 8.53*** 
        
Year dummies    Yes   Yes 
Industry dummies    Yes   Yes 
        
N    11,748   11,748 
F-statistic    40.70***    
Adj. R2       11.11%      
LR statistic       916.35*** 
-2 Log L       14,702.81 
        
The continuous dependent variable is measured as the ratio of the sum of the sales of the clients of an 
auditor in a two-digit SIC industry to the total sum of the sales of all companies in that industry (Dunn and 
Mayhew, 2004), rescaled by 100 to simplify the display.  The categorical dependent variable is coded “1” 
if the continuous market share measure is greater than the cut-off and “0” otherwise, where the cut-off is 
20% for years 1996 to 1997, 24% for years 1998 to 2001, and 30% for years 2002 to 2006.   
***, **, and * denote a significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (one-tailed tests).   
 
 
